Complex Tax Incentives: An Experimental Investigation

By Johannes Abeler, Simon Jäger. Social Science Research Network, 2013

126 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How does tax complexity affect people’s reaction to tax changes? To answer this question, we conduct an experiment in which subjects work for a piece rate and face taxes. One treatment features a simple, the other a complex tax system. The payoff-maximizing effort level and the incentives around this optimum are, however, identical across treatments. We introduce the same sequence of additional taxes in both treatments. Subjects in the complex treatment underreact to new taxes; some ignore new taxes entirely. Contrary to predictions from models of rational inattention, subjects are equally likely to ignore large or small incentive changes.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, General Decision Sciences

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e11ef02ceb50823e41835ba382cd962169a352f6

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In Economics and Econometrics

  1. Alex Rees-Jones
  2. Teodora Tsankova
  3. J. De Neve
  4. Maarten Luts
  5. Dmitry Taubinsky
  6. Clément A. C. Imbert
  7. Johannes Spinnewijn

In General Decision Sciences

  1. Alex Rees-Jones
  2. Dmitry Taubinsky
  3. Johannes Spinnewijn

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