Four decades of scientific explanation
By W. Salmon. 1989
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
- Tim Miller
- Tania Lombrozo
- Arnold B. Bakker
- Evangelia Demerouti
- Joseph Y. Halpern
- Judea Pearl
- Josh Tenenbaum
- Wilmar B. Schaufeli
Citations in the corpus
- Explanation in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Social Sciences (2017, background): “But what constitutes an explanation? This question has created a lot of debate in philosophy, but accounts of explanation both philosophical and psychology stress the importance of causality in explanation — that is, an explanation refers to causes [158, 190, 107, 59].”
- Explanation and Abductive Inference (2012, background): “Subscriber: Princeton University Library; date: 03 August 2018 explanations—which explain how something in fact did come about (e.g., Salmon, 1989).”
- Realism as a Stance for Mixed Methods Research (2010, methodology): “For the philosophy of science in general, this approach was most systematically developed by Salmon (1984; 1989; 1998), who referred to it as the “causal/mechanical” view.”
- Causes and explanations: A structural-model approach (2000, background): “We refer the reader to (Hall 1998; Sosa and Tooley 1993; Pearl 2000) for details and criticism of the probabilistic and logical approaches to causality in the philosophy literature, and to (Chajewska and Halpern 1997; Gärdenfors 1988; Hempel 1965; Pearl 1988; Salmon 1989) for some background on expl”
- Quality Meets Quantity: Case Studies, Conditional Probability, and Counterfactuals (2004, unknown): “Salmon 1989, 168.”
- What does organizational change mean?: Speculations on a taken for granted category (2001, background): “1Individualism makes single actors and one-to-one transactions the cornerstone of social theory (see Nagel, 1963, 1968; Donzelli, 1986; Salmon, 1989; Sparti, 1995).”
- Kin Selection and Its Critics (2015, background): “As philosophers of science have often noted, a principle can be explanatory without being predictive and vice versa (Salmon 1989).”
- Law and Explanation in Biology: Invariance Is the Kind of Stability That Matters (2001, background): “Both the absence of consensus and the limitations of some of the standard criteria for lawfulness are discussed in Salmon 1989.”