Political Resource Allocation: Benefits and Costs of Voter Initiatives

By John G. Matsusaka, N. McCarty. 2001

181 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/de02c4d01befc929efa99162de2d6e9d0748154a

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. S. Hug
2. Arthur Lupia
3. John G. Matsusaka
4. Breno Schmidt
5. N. J. Foss
6. Peter G. Klein

In Political Science and International Relations

1. S. Hug
2. Arthur Lupia
3. John G. Matsusaka

Citations in the corpus

• Occurrence and Policy Consequences of Referendums (2004, background): “The assumption of complete and perfect information is the usual suspect for this anomaly, as both Moser (1996) and Matsusaka and McCarty (2001) implicitly show.”
• DIRECT DEMOCRACY: New Approaches to Old Questions (2004, methodology): “For example, Matsusaka & McCarty (2001) show that when the legislature is uncertain about the preferences of the majority of voters, the voters might be worse off having the initiative available because the legislature will cater to special interests in an effort to avoid the risk of an initiative…”
• The economic effects of direct democracy—a first global assessment (2009, unknown): “6 Relying on a three actor model (a representative, an interest group and a voter), Matsusaka and McCarty (2001) show that when uncertainty over voter preference is introduced, there are parameter constellations under which the (median) voter is worse off under a mixture of directrepresentative…”
• Budget Referendums and Government Spending: Evidence from Swiss Cantons (2003, unknown): “Matsusaka and McCarty’s (2001) study of the voter initiative is a step in this direction.”