Insurance, Self-Protection, and the Economics of Terrorism

By Darius N. Lakdawalla, George Zanjani. 2005

126 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

Choosing What to Protect: Strategic Defensive Allocation Against an Unknown Attacker (2007, unknown): “Lakdawalla and Zanjani (2002) show that insurance can be used to coordinate the behavior of defenders facing incentives to free ride.”
Balancing Terrorism and Natural Disasters - Defensive Strategy with Endogenous Attacker Effort (2007, unknown): “Subject classifications : decision analysis: risk; games/group decisions: noncooperative; utility/preference: applications.”
Income, interdependence, and substitution effects affecting incentives for security investment (2006, methodology): “They show that ‘‘Deterrence hi.e. income reductioni takes place insofar as private self protection raises A and lowers the total amount of violent terror investments’’ (Lakdawalla and Zanjani, 2002, p. 11).”