The political economy of the COVID‐19 pandemic
By Peter J. Boettke, Benjamin Powell. 2021
85 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Abstract We argue that the policy response to the COVID‐19 pandemic by all levels of government around the world is not consistent with recommendations from standard welfare economics. Thus, it is important to ask why such policies have been adopted. That opens the door to examining the political economy of the COVID‐19 pandemic. This requires examining the incentives and information that confront policymakers and voters and the institutional environments that shape their incentives and information. This lead article frames questions addressed in the remainder of the symposium.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science, Economics & Operations Research, Social Sciences & Humanities
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Citations in the corpus
- The Effects of Reward Misspecification: Mapping and Mitigating Misaligned Models (2022, background): “…larger policy is politically unfavorable: regulations are high even though public signs of infection, such as ICU usage, are low. preemptive regulations may however be politically costly, as enforcing restrictions without clear signs of infection may foment public unrest (Boettke & Powell, 2021).”