Credit growth, problem loans and credit risk provisioning in Spain

By S. Lis, Jorge Martínez Pagés, Jesús Saurina. 2000

335 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/dc1aac3e329b8799b80c4b3ea353b37b4be06e24

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Citations in the corpus

Nonperforming Loans in the GCC Banking System and Their Macroeconomic Effects (2010, methodology): “Lis et al. (2000) also used a simultaneous equation model to explain bank loan losses in Spain and found that GDP growth (contemporaneous, as well as one period lag term), bank size, and CAR, had a negative effect while loan growth, collateral, net-interest margin, debt-equity, market power,…”
Towards a Macroprudential Framework for Financial Supervision and Regulation? (2003, unknown): “39 See Fernández de Lis et al (2001) and Borio and Lowe (2001).”
Macroeconomic and Bank-Specific Determinants of Non-Performing Loans: Evidence from Nepalese Banking System (2018, background): “Salas and Saurina (2002) and Fernández de Lis et al. (2000) reported a negative relationship between NPL and bank size.”
Bank Specific, Business and Institutional Environment Determinants of Banks Nonperforming Loans: Evidence from MENA Countries (2010, background): “Particularly, during periods of economic growth, the financial institutions engage in market share conquest campaigns discarding the necessary assessment of credit quality of borrowers (Fernandez De Lis et al., 2000). The search for rapid growth of loans is achieved by either reducing interest rate ”
Banking supervision and nonperforming loans: a cross-country analysis (2009, background): “Hu et al. (2004) argue that unjustified risky behaviour is lower when the two groups check and balance each other. In the opposite, when private and state shareholders collude, especially in societies with little civil disciplines, problem loans will be higher due to risky credit offering. Tian (200”
Macroprudential Policy, Countercyclical Bank Capital Buffers, and Credit Supply: Evidence from the Spanish Dynamic Provisioning Experiments (2017, unknown): “See also Fernández de Lis et al. (2000) and Banco de España (2004).”
Capital-Account and Counter-Cyclical Prudential Regulations in Developing Countries (2003, background): “This generates a dynamic in which provisions build up during economic expansions and are drawn upon during downturns (Poveda 2000, De Lis et al. 2001).”