CEO Overconfidence and Earnings Management During Shifting Regulatory Regimes

By Tien‐Shih Hsieh, Jean C. Bedard, Karla M. Johnstone. 2014

150 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/db967a496f5218276d227b1d4a2f41238d1a1c1f

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Martin Plöckinger
2. Roman Rohatschek
3. Ewald Aschauer
4. M. Hiebl

In Finance

1. Martin Plöckinger
2. Roman Rohatschek
3. Ewald Aschauer
4. M. Hiebl

In Strategy and Management

1. Martin Plöckinger
2. Roman Rohatschek
3. Ewald Aschauer
4. M. Hiebl

Citations in the corpus

• The influence of individual executives on corporate financial reporting: A review and outlook from the perspective of upper echelons theory (2016, background): “Hsieh et al. (2014) con fi rm these fi ndings by showing that overcon fi dent CEOs are more inclined to manage earnings and feel less constrained by the Sarbanes – Oxley Act than normally con fi dent CEOs.”
• “See You in Court”: How CEO narcissism increases firms' vulnerability to lawsuits (2017, unknown): “These studies have shown that narcissistic CEOs are more likely to manipulate corporate earnings (Buchholz, Lopatta, &Maas, 2014; Frino et al., 2015; Hsieh et al., 2014), restate financial reports (Ham et al., 2017), aggressively avoid paying taxes (Olsen & Stekelberg, 2015), and produce lower…”