Implementing coordination contracts in a manufacturer Stackelberg dual-channel supply chain
By J. Chen, Hui Zhang, Ying Sun. Omega, 2012
518 citations recorded by the source corpus.
We examine a manufacturer's pricing strategies in a dual-channel supply chain, in which the manufacturer is a Stackelberg leader and the retailer is a follower. We show the conditions under which the manufacturer and the retailer both prefer a dual-channel supply chain. We examine the coordination schemes for a dual-channel supply chain and find that a manufacturer's contract with a wholesale price and a price for the direct channel can coordinate the dual-channel supply channel, benefiting the retailer but not the manufacturer. We illustrate how such a contract with a complementary agreement, such as a two-part tariff or a profit-sharing agreement, can coordinate the dual-channel supply chain and enable both the manufacturer and the retailer to be a win–win.
Subfields: Management Information Systems, Marketing, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/db5d7918993d624eee5424c743c09a75d5e011a9
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In Management Information Systems
In Marketing
In Strategy and Management
Citations in the corpus
- Dual-channel supply chain pricing decisions with a risk-averse retailer (2014, background): “Chen, Zhang, and Sun (2012) examined a manufacturer’s pricing strategies in a dual-channel supply chain and illustrated that a contract with a complementary agreement could allow both the manufacturer and the retailer to achieve coordination.”