Fiscal News, State Budget Rules, and Tax-Exempt Bond Yields☆

By J. Poterba, Kim S. Rueben. 2001

172 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/db1a53d3420ccb8e1b6ff2a920a0922a525c496b

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In Economics and Econometrics

Citations in the corpus

Fiscal Rules for Sub-Central Governments: Design and Impact (2005, background): “Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994), Poterba (1994), Poterba and Rueben (2001). switch in expenditure to budget items which are unconstrained by the same rules49 , but expenditure limits which apply across-the-board irrespective of priorities may lead to rationing of key public services.”
Yield spreads on EMU government bonds (2003, background): “Moreover, fiscal rules such as the Stability and Growth Pact may change the market perception of default risk, and thus have an impact on interest rates (see, for example, Poterba and Reuben, 2001).”
Fiscal Federalism: US History for Architects of Europe's Fiscal Union (2012, unknown): “In a subsequent paper (Poterba and Rueben, 2001), they show that unexpected deficits lead to higher yields for states with weak rules than states with strong rules.”
Sovereign Bond Market Reactions to Fiscal Rules and No-Bailout Clauses - The Swiss Experience (2013, unknown): “In a related study, Poterba and Rueben (2001) also analyse the reaction of risk premia on unexpected deficit shocks.”
Fiscal institutions, fiscal policy and sovereign risk premia in EMU (2008, unknown): “Poterba and Rueben (1999, 2001) analyze the role of state fiscal institutions on interest rates in the U.S. municipal bond market.”
Market Discipline, Financial Integration and Fiscal Rules: What Drives Spreads in the Euro Area Government Bond Market? (2007, unknown): “A common approach is to deduct from the interest rate spreads the difference 6 Poterba and Rueben (2001) report evidence for US States that tight anti-deficit rules lead to smaller interest rate increases in case of unexpected deficits than in States without such fiscal rules.”
Fool the Markets? Creative Accounting, Fiscal Transparency and Sovereign Risk Premia (2006, unknown): “In this context, Poterba and Rueben (1999, 2001) analyze the role of state fiscal institutions on interest rates in the United States municipal bond market.”