Patent Pools and Cross-Licensing in the Shadow of Patent Litigation

By Jay Pil Choi. Social Science Research Network, 2010

188 citations recorded by the source corpus.

This paper develops a framework to analyze the incentives to form a patent pool or engage in cross-licensing arrangements in the presence of uncertainty about the validity and coverage of patents that makes disputes inevitable. It analyzes the private incentives to litigate and compares them with the social incentives. It shows that pooling arrangements can have the effect of sheltering invalid patents from challenges. This result has an antitrust implication that patent pools should not be permitted until after patentees have challenged the validity of each other’s patents if litigation costs are not too large.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management of Technology and Innovation

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/da8b1ea3de308b25eb77f6d103196125bb06d4e7

Citations in the corpus

• Adverse Effects of Patent Pooling on Product Development and Commercialization (2014, unknown): “The firm’s output is given in (5) and the equilibrium value is derived in Appendix A and given by (45), from whence if follows that the patent holders’ objective is”