Financial Intermediaries and Markets

By Franklin Allen, Douglas Gale. 2004

764 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/da15cc57dc4ac5f4f982a2f2bbeae217703fe7aa

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Citations in the corpus

Bank regulatory capital and liquidity: Evidence from US and European publicly traded banks (2013, background): “Here, liquidity creation increases the bank’s exposure to risk, as its losses increase with the level of illiquid assets to satisfy the liquidity demands of customers (Allen and Gale, 2004).”
Bubbles, Financial Crises, and Systemic Risk (2012, positive): “Allen and Gale (1998, 2004) extend the original Diamond-Dybvig model by intro- 12In Gorton (1985), a bank can stop a run if R = RH .”
The Theory of Bank Risk Taking and Competition Revisited (2005, background): “Allen and Gale (2004) show that in a general equilibrium model with financial intermediation, asymmetric information, and incomplete contracts, the perfectly competitive allocation is constrained efficient and financial instability is necessary for efficiency.”
A lost century in economics: Three theories of banking and the conclusive evidence☆ (2016, background): “…and Newman (1989); Gorton and Pennacchi (1990); Bencivenga and Smith (1991); Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Rajan (1998), Myers and Rajan (1998), Allen and Gale (2004a, 2004b); Allen and Santomero (2001); Diamond and Rajan (2001); Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002); Matthews and Thompson (2005);…”
Financial Crises: Theory and Evidence (2009, background): “economy. Allen and Gale (2004) develop a general equilibrium framework for understanding”
Do Banks Benefit from Internationalization? Revisiting the Market Power-Risk Nexus (2013, neutral): “Allen and Gale (2004) suggest a negative relation between bank risk and market power because more concentrated banking systems reduce incentives of bankers to lend recklessly.”
A Model of Capital and Crises (2012, positive): “This cash-in-the-market can be linked to the balance sheet position of intermediaries, and Allen and Gale (2005) draw such a connection more explicitly.”
Bank Liquidity Creation and Real Economic Output (2017, neutral): “opportunities to meet customers’ liquidity demands (Allen and Santomero, 1997; Allen and Gale, 2004).”
The Role of Liquidity in Financial Crises (2008, background): “Allen and Gale (2004a, 2007), among others, develop such an approach.”
Inefficient Credit Booms (2007, methodology): “zs = ∂V (n1s,rs) ∂n1 =m ax ½ rs − θ 1 − θ ,1 ¾ , ( 4 )”