How does mindfulness transform suffering? I: the nature and origins of dukkha
By J. Teasdale, Michael Chaskalson. 2011
108 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Clinical Psychology, Social Psychology
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d9b43f582a48ed38d8a1f9ce7df172074fb8ae1b
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Clinical Psychology
- Barbara L. Fredrickson
- Antoine Lutz
- Amishi P. Jha
- Clifford D. Saron
- Philippe R. Goldin
- N. Farb
- Eric L. Garland
- J. Dunne
In Social Psychology
- Eric L. Garland
- Philippe R. Goldin
- N. Farb
- J. Dunne
- Antoine Lutz
- Barbara L. Fredrickson
- Clifford D. Saron
- Amishi P. Jha
Citations in the corpus
- How do mindfulness-based cognitive therapy and mindfulness-based stress reduction improve mental health and wellbeing? A systematic review and meta-analysis of mediation studies. (2015, background): “…it did not confine its search to studies with specific samples and outcomes, reflecting the perspective supported by many proponents of mindfulness, that the underlying mechanisms of its effects are the same across different intensities of suffering in all people (e.g. Teasdale & Chaskalson, 2011).”
- Mindfulness Broadens Awareness and Builds Eudaimonic Meaning: A Process Model of Mindful Positive Emotion Regulation (2015, background): “As Teasdale and Chaskalson (2011) state: “mindfulness is characterized by configurations of cognitive processing in which working memory for implicit, intuitive meaning plays a central role; when mindfulness transforms suffering by changing the way experience is processed or viewed, the integration…”
- Investigating the Phenomenological Matrix of Mindfulness-related Practices from a Neurocognitive Perspective (2015, background): “For instance, the Object Orientation dimension could be sub-divided along different aspects of attention (sustained, selective, disengagement) or implicit or explicit working memory (see Teasdale & Chaskalson, 2011a–b).”