Naive and Yet Enlightened: From Natural Frequencies to Fast and Frugal Decision Trees

By Laura Martignon, O. Vitouch, Masanori Takezawa, Malcolm R. Forster. 2003

120 citations recorded by the source corpus.

An evolutionary view of rationality as an adaptive toolbox of fast and frugal heuristics is sometimes placed in opposition to probability as the ideal of enlightened rational human inference. Indeed, this opposition has become the cornerstone of an ongoing debate between adherents to theories of normative as opposed to bounded rationality. On the one hand, it has been shown that probability provides a good approximation to human cognitive processing for tasks involving simple inferences, and humans actually are able to reason the Bayesian way when information is presented in formats to which they are well adapted (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995). On the other hand, it is clear that probabilistic inference becomes infeasible when the mind has to deal with too many pieces of information at once. Coping with resource limitations, the mind—as Gigerenzer, Todd and the ABC Research Group (1999) claim— adopts simple inference heuristics, often based on just one-reason decision making. Our aim is to present a unifying framework, based on the systematic use of trees for knowledge representation, both for fully Bayesian and for fast and frugal decisions.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, General Decision Sciences

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d99a7c3320b91bd9b654c7ef4eea268e06e449aa

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Artificial Intelligence

  1. Gerd Gigerenzer
  2. Ralph Hertwig
  3. Till Grüne-Yanoff
  4. R. García‐Retamero
  5. Stefan M. Herzog

In General Decision Sciences

  1. Ralph Hertwig
  2. Gerd Gigerenzer
  3. Till Grüne-Yanoff
  4. R. García‐Retamero
  5. A. Glöckner
  6. T. Betsch
  7. Arch G. Woodside
  8. Daniel G. Goldstein

Citations in the corpus