A Counter-example to Karlin's Strong Conjecture for Fictitious Play
By Constantinos Daskalakis, Qinxuan Pan. 2014
50 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Fictitious play is a natural dynamic for equilibrium play in zero-sum games, proposed by Brown [6], and shown to converge by Robinson [33]. Samuel Karlin conjectured in 1959 that fictitious play converges at rate O(t-1/2) with respect to the number of steps t. We disprove this conjecture by showing that, when the payoff matrix of the row player is the n × n identity matrix, fictitious play may converge (for some tie-breaking) at rate as slow as Ω(t-1/n).
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Game & Decision Theory
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In Economics and Econometrics
- Aaron Roth
- Simon Lacoste-Julien
- Eric P. Xing
- Sergey Levine
- Aleksandrs Slivkins
- Michael Kearns
- Gauthier Gidel
In Management Science and Operations Research
- Aaron Roth
- Zhiwei Steven Wu
- Benjamin Eysenbach
- Ruslan Salakhutdinov
- Michael Kearns
- Seth Neel
- Eric P. Xing
- Emilio Parisotto
In Game & Decision Theory
- Simon Lacoste-Julien
- Aaron Roth
- Sergey Levine
- Aleksandrs Slivkins
- Michael Kearns
- Benjamin Eysenbach
- Gauthier Gidel
Citations in the corpus
- Frank-Wolfe Algorithms for Saddle Point Problems (2016, background): “Interestingly, Daskalakis and Pan (2014) recently showed that Shapiro’s rate is also a lower bound if the tie breaking rule gets the worst pick an infinite number of times.”
- Preventing Fairness Gerrymandering: Auditing and Learning for Subgroup Fairness (2017, background): “The disadvantage is that Fictitious Play is only known to converge to equilibrium in the limit Robinson [1951], rather than in a polynomial number of rounds (though it is conjectured to converge quickly under rather general circumstances; see Daskalakis and Pan [2014] for a recent discussion).”
- Efficient Exploration via State Marginal Matching (2019, background): “A slight variant, fictitious play (Brown, 1951) does converge to a Nash equilibrium in finite time (Robinson, 1951; Daskalakis & Pan, 2014).”
- Introduction to Multi-Armed Bandits (2019, background): “This convergence rate is the best possible (Daskalakis and Pan, 2014).”