Companion to the Political Economy of Rent Seeking
By Roger D. Congleton, Arye L. Hillman. 2015
151 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d8408f4bfae7b1d240c164c3b2be700600939048
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Emmanuel Dechenaux
- Dan Kovenock
- Roman M. Sheremeta
- Toke S. Aidt
- Rajeev Kumar Goel
- Guglielmo Tosato
- Eugen Dimant
- Benjamin Powell
In Sociology and Political Science
- Dan Kovenock
- Emmanuel Dechenaux
- Roman M. Sheremeta
- Toke S. Aidt
- Guglielmo Tosato
- Eugen Dimant
- Taner Güney
- Rajeev Kumar Goel
Citations in the corpus
- A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments (2014, background): “Although there are numerous factors that may contribute to overbidding, as discussed by Sheremeta (2013, 2015), it remains an open question as to whether some of these factors are related to each other and which are the most important.”
- Rent seeking and the economics of corruption (2016, background): “The papers in Congleton and Hillman (2015) summarize the different dimensions of the rent-seeking literature.”
- Behavior in Group Contests: A Review of Experimental Research (2015, unknown): “First, it is well documented that people behave overly competitive even in simple contests between individuals (Sheremeta, 2013, 2015).”