The bounds of cognition

By Fred Adams, K. Aizawa. 2001

883 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Experimental and Cognitive Psychology

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d729002d45c826ea6d61d3f4b23c58b2791336fa

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In Cognitive Neuroscience

In Experimental and Cognitive Psychology

Citations in the corpus

Scaffoldings of the affective mind (2015, background): “At one extreme of this dimension is the internalist position according to which the mind supervenes on the brain only (e.g., Adams & Aizawa, 2001; Searle, 1992); at the other extreme is the externalist view according to which the mind is necessarily constituted by the environment (Hutto & Myin,…”
Extended Cognition and Functionalism (2009, background): “Our view is that cognition cs [without HEC] will produce a natural science, where cognition c [with HEC] will not’ (Adams and Aizawa 2001, pp. 61–62). divergent truth value from HEC.”
Making Sense of Sense-Making: Reflections on Enactive and Extended Mind Theories (2009, background): “By contrast, the extended mind thesis and the debates it has engendered to-date have neglected emotion and treated cognition as if it were largely affectless problem solving or information processing (Adams and Aizawa 2008; Clark 2007 ).”
Extended cognition and the mark of the cognitive (2009, background): “[9] Adams and Aizawa (2001). [10] Marr’s theory has also been picked because of its utter familiarity.”
Attacking the Bounds of Cognition (2006, background): “Recently internalists (Adams & Aizawa, 2001, 2006; Rupert, 2004) have mounted a counter-attack on the attempt to redefine the bounds of cognition.”
Coupling, Constitution and the Cognitive Kind: A Reply to Adam and Aizawa (2006, background): “brute factively 'cognitive'? Nor, I think, is this merely an isolated stylistic infelicity on the part of Adams and Aizawa. For the same issue arose many times during personal exchanges concerning the vexed case of Otto and his notebook (the example used, with, importantly, a great many riders and q”
Seeing mind in action (2012, background): “In other words, “it simply does not follow from that fact that process X is in some way causally connected (i.e., coupled) to a cognitive process that X is thereby part of that cognitive process” (Adams and Aizawa 2008, p. 91).”
Human nature and cognitive–developmental niche construction (2010, background): “Even from accounts that would like to integrate views of the mind as deeply embodied, embedded in and scaffolded by the environment into the traditional view (Adams and Aizawa 2001; Rupert 2009).”
Extending the extended mind: the case for extended affectivity (2015, background): “…formulated by Clark and Chalmers (1998) and has been further elaborated by Andy Clark in subsequent works (e.g., Clark 2003, 2008, 2010a, b), partly in response to critical engagement by those sympathetic to internalism (for example by Adams and Aizawa 2001, 2010a, b; Rupert 2004; Weiskopf 2008).”
How to situate cognition: Letting nature take its course (2009, background): “…between inner and outer processes, the parity claim was specifically meant to undermine any tendency to think that the shape of the (present day, human) inner processes sets some bar (as, for example, Adams and Aizawa 2001 suggest) on what ought to count as part of a genuinely cognitive process.”
The psychology of memory, extended cognition, and socially distributed remembering (2010, methodology): “In this paper, we follow recent critics in testing such hypotheses against evidence from scientific psychology, and in particular against the cognitive psychology of memory (Rupert 2004, 2009; Adams and Aizawa 2008).”
The narrative self, distributed memory, and evocative objects (2018, background): “Some philosophers claim that the relations between the components in situated cognitive systems are merely causal (Adams and Aizawa 2001; Rupert 2004), whereas others argue that these relations are constitutive (Clark and Chalmers 1998, Hutchins 1995a, b; Menary 2007; Sutton 2010; Wheeler 2011).”
The socially extended mind (2013, background): “Even if externalities play a role in cognition, according to Adams and Aizawa (2010), they play only a contextual, enabling or causal role rather than a constitutive role. On their internalist concept of the mind, all of the real constituting action of cognition happens in the brain, even if it is i”
Supersizing the Mind (2008, neutral): “Rupert (2004, 2009) and Adams and Aizawa (2001, 2008) have consistently engaged the EMT, challenging Clark on many fronts.”
Emotions beyond brain and body (2014, background): “[9] Since the opponents of situated approaches admit that cognition (or affectivity) might be extended (e.g., Adams & Aizawa, 2008), the only interesting issue is whether they actually are extended.”
Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science. (2013, background): “That procedure (which will work in all worlds where there is organism-detectable regularity in space or time - see Hosoya (2005), Schwarz, Hsu and Dayan (2007)) allows a learner reliably to match its internal generative model to the statistical properties of the signal source (the world) yielding co”