Evolutionary analysis of sustainable tourism

By Peng He, Yong He, Feifei Xu. 2018

142 citations recorded by the source corpus.

This paper aims to explore an effective green incentive mechanism for government to develop traditional tourism into green tourism by establishing a dynamic evolutionary game model among governments, tourism enterprises, and tourists. We first discuss the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) regarding green innovation and its corresponding conditions for each stakeholder, and then analyze the ESS between tourism enterprises and tourists, with and without consideration of government green supervision. The optimal green incentive condition for driving all stakeholders to conduct green behavior is identified. More importantly, we advise the government to first implement green incentive mechanism in the areas where the tourism market scale is relatively small. Additionally, we utilize numerical examples to illustrate the findings and provide some managerial insights.

Subfields: Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d713595847420995b920795d0502961632a44640