Agency Conflicts in Public and Negotiated Transfers of Corporate Control

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Corporate Governance Convergence : Evidence from Takeover Regulation Reforms in Europe (2005, background): “13 It is only in the absence of large private benefits of control that private negotiations with the incumbent controlling blockholder are likely to result in lower costs for a control transfer than an open market purchase from dispersed shareholders (Bagnoli and Lipman (1988), Holmstrom and Nalebuf”
Ownership structure, control contestability, and corporate debt maturity (2015, unknown): “ 9 Burkart et al. (2000) argue that direct evidence on private benefits is hard to find.”
Quantifying Private Benefits of Control from a Structural Model of Block Trades (2010, unknown): “We estimate the block pricing model in Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (2000) explicitly accounting for both block premia and block discounts in the data.”
Negotiations Under the Threat of an Auction (2010, unknown): “A related two-stage representation of the takeover contest can also be found in Burkart et al. (2000).”
One Share - One Vote: The Theory (2007, background): “…in control, the bidder has the option 16 In the theoretical literature, the block price is typically the outcome of a bargaining game between incumbent and bidder that depends on the parties outside options (see e.g., Burkart et al., 2000). to purchase the remaining voting and non-voting shares.”