Lottery Versus All-Pay Auction Models of Lobbying

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Contest functions : theoretical foundations and issues in estimation (2013, background): “Other circumstances have also been identified in the literature such as budget constrained contestants (Che and Gale, 1997), valuation asymmetries (Fang, 2002) and endogenous lobbying proposals (Münster, 2006) under which the standard Tullock lottery contest might be superior to an all-pay auction…”
The theory of contests: a survey (2007, background): “See Gradstein (1995), Baik (1998), Nti (1999) and Fang (2002) for further study of comparative statics when contest success functions are not symmetric.”
Entry into Winner-Take-All and Proportional-Prize Contests: An Experimental Study (2010, methodology): “(2) are positive for all players participating in the proportional-prize contest and the expected payoff is positive only for the strongest player in thewinnertake-all contest (Baye et al., 1993, 1996; Fang, 2002; Ryvkin, 2007)(11).”
Political Culture and Discrimination in Contests (2011, unknown): “The contrast between Proposition 5 and Proposition 2 in Fang (2002) is due to his different model where no discrimination (exogenous or endogenous) is allowed and 1=α .”