Lattice Cryptography for the Internet
By Chris Peikert. Post-Quantum Cryptography, 2014
407 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d5eef01e305a0d5e13a75d146eb114e0b590523d
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Artificial Intelligence
- Michael Naehrig
- Léo Ducas
- Peter Schwabe
- Thomas Pöppelmann
- Frederik Vercauteren
- Vadim Lyubashevsky
- Patrick Longa
- Damien Stehlé
In Computer Networks and Communications
- Vadim Lyubashevsky
- Léo Ducas
- Michael Naehrig
- Patrick Longa
- Peter Schwabe
- Jintai Ding
- Ilya Mironov
- Eike Kiltz
Citations in the corpus
- A Modular Analysis of the Fujisaki-Okamoto Transformation (2017, background): “As observed by Peikert [34], due to their decision/search equivalence, many natural lattice-based encryption scheme are not OW - PCA secure and it is not clear how to modify them to be so.”
- Post-quantum Key Exchange - A New Hope (2016, methodology): “In this section we briefly revisit the passively secure key-encapsulation mechanism (KEM) that was proposed by Peikert [71] and instantiated in [18] (BCNS).”
- Saber: Module-LWR based key exchange, CPA-secure encryption and CCA-secure KEM (2018, background): “As in previous works [24,40,12], we can make this failure probability negligibly small by sending some additional reconciliation data c.”
- A Simple Provably Secure Key Exchange Scheme Based on the Learning with Errors Problem (2012, methodology): “We would like to point out that a very recent work by Peikert [24] also presents an efficient key exchange protocol, but with totally different techniques from ours.”
- Speeding up the Number Theoretic Transform for Faster Ideal Lattice-Based Cryptography (2016, background): “R-LWE-based schemes have been proposed for public-key encryption [35, 24, 28], digital signatures [22, 12], and key exchange [11, 28, 36, 6, 2].”
- Frodo: Take off the Ring! Practical, Quantum-Secure Key Exchange from LWE (2016, methodology): “We focus on the case when the modulus q is a power of 2; this can be generalized to an arbitrary modulus using techniques described in [53].”
- CRYSTALS - Kyber: A CCA-Secure Module-Lattice-Based KEM (2017, background): “The advantage of the constructions in [36], [62] is that if one would like to construct a CPA-secure KEM transmitting a b-bit key, then the ciphertext is b bits shorter, which is about a 3% savings for typical parameters.”
- A Full RNS Variant of FV Like Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption Schemes (2016, background): “In addition to encryption/signature schemes ([15, 25, 18, 7, 21, 22]), identity-based encryption [8], multilinear maps [10, 16], lattices are also involved in homomorphic encryption (HE).”
- Post-Quantum Key Exchange for the TLS Protocol from the Ring Learning with Errors Problem (2015, methodology): “In [20], a reconciliation function is defined to recover bveq,2 from an element w ∈ Zq close to an element v ∈ Zq, given only w and the cross-rounding 〈v〉q,2.”