Sovereign Debt Markets in Turbulent Times: Creditor Discrimination and Crowding-Out Effects

By Fernando A. Broner, Aitor Erce, Alberto Martin, Jaume Ventura. 2014

327 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Finance, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d44fca53789783fa17e6d6ab27f47a1542256a99

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Finance

1. Margherita Bottero
2. Simone Lenzu
3. Filippo Mezzanotti
4. M. Obstfeld
5. Luigi Bocola
6. G. Hale
7. T. Tsuda
8. Serkan Arslanalp

In Strategy and Management

1. Luigi Bocola
2. G. Hale
3. T. Tsuda
4. M. Obstfeld
5. Serkan Arslanalp
6. Hélène Rey

Citations in the corpus

• Sovereign debt exposure and the bank lending channel: Impact on credit supply and the real economy (2020, background): “by the ECB to counteract the dysfunctions in sovereign markets (Broner et al. 2014; Acharya and Steffen 2015).”
• Rethinking the Effects of Financial Globalization (2016, unknown): “This is why we assumed instead that price discrimination is not possible in Broner et al. (2014).”
• Tracking Global Demand for Emerging Market Sovereign Debt (2014, background): “The approach is in line with Broner et al. (2013) which show how sovereign debt can get reallocated from foreign to domestic holders in turbulent times due to creditor discrimination.”
• Deadly Embrace: Sovereign and Financial Balance Sheets Doom Loops (2018, unknown): “11See Broner et al (2013), Genaioli et al (2013) and Uhlig (2014) for careful documentations.”
• The Pass-Through of Sovereign Risk (2016, background): “Borensztein and Panizza (2009) show that sovereign defaults typically occur in proximity of banking crises. pass-through of sovereign risk 883 Nikolov (2013), Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl (2014), Broner et al. (2014), and Fahri and Tirole (2014).”
• The dynamics of sovereign debt crises and bailouts (2016, unknown): “Our paper is closely related to the literature on multiple equilibria in models of sovereign default, most notably Cole and Kehoe (1996, 2000), Conesa and Kehoe (2012, 2014), Corsetti and Dedola (2014), and Broner et al.”
• The Invisible Hand of the Government: Moral Suasion during the European Sovereign Debt Crisis (2019, unknown): “This literature has proposed several explanations for the rise in banks’ domestic sovereign bond holdings, such as creditor discrimination (Broner et al., 2014), risk shifting (Uhlig, 2014; Drechsler et al., 2016), gambling for resurrection (Crosignani, 2017), carry trading (Acharya and Steffen,…”
• The Euro and the Geography of International Debt Flows (2014, background): “(8)Broner et al. (2014) argue that expected preferential treatment of domestic holders of domestic sovereign debt led to a national home bias in debt holdings after the euro crisis broke out. Analogous expectations might have led core euro area lenders to concentrate their risks on euro area borrowe”