Bedfellows, Hostages, or Perfect Strangers? Global Capital Markets and the Catalytic Effect of IMF Crisis Lending
By C. Cottarelli, C. Giannini. Social Science Research Network, 2002
117 citations recorded by the source corpus.
During the 1990s, the concept of catalytic official finance (COF) gained prominence in policy debates. The concept revolves around the idea that the propensity of investors to lend to a country increases when the IMF provides its seal of approval - backed up by only limited official financing - on the country's economic program. COF aims at avoiding, on the one hand, the massive use of public money to bail out private investors; on the other, the recourse to coercive bailing-in mechanisms. The paper concludes that COF, while possibly useful in other contexts, is less reliable when used to manage capital account crises.
Subfields: Development, Finance, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d445b91321bf45fc8e5d4e5eeb877922bc70d896
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In Finance
- Hyun Song Shin
- Stephen Morris
- Zhiguo He
- Tobias Adrian
- Itay Goldstein
- Daniela Gabor
- Markus K. Brunnermeier
- Stijn Claessens
In Strategy and Management
Citations in the corpus
- Catalytic finance: When does it work? (2006, background): “On the face of it, there is much circumstantial evidence that catalytic finance has not been effective (see Ghosh et al. and Cottarelli and Giannini (2002) for a survey of the literature).”