Deposit Insurance, Moral Hazard and Market Monitoring
By Reint Gropp, J. Vesala. 2004
367 citations recorded by the source corpus.
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d277f4366c5bc9cae2f99c6831c470382fcf6568
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Citations in the corpus
- Banking crises and market discipline: International evidence (2012, methodology): “23 with the findings of Hadad et al. (2011) for Indonesian banks following the 1997-1998 financial crisis.”
- Deposit Insurance Coverage, Ownership, and Banks' Risk-Taking in Emerging Markets (2010, background): “Gropp and Vesala (2004) and Nier and Baumann (2006) use provisions for non-performing loans and the standard deviation of equity returns as proxies for banks’ risk exposure.”
- Banking Competition and Capital Ratios (2007, unknown): “Third, the moral hazard index enters positively and significantly, suggesting that deposit insurance can encourage bank managers to hold higher levels of capital which may reflect a commitment that deposit insurance will only be limited to insured depositors (Gropp and Vesala, 2004).”
- Financial liberalization and bank risk-taking: International evidence (2014, background): “…charter value and bank risk-taking is extensive and, to our knowledge, exists for US banks (Keeley, 1990; Galloway et al., 1997; among others), Japanese banks (Konishi and Yasuda, 2004), a sample of EU banks (Gropp and Vesala, 2004), and for a sample of more than 30 countries (González, 2005;…”
- The impact of bank regulations, supervision, market structure, and bank characteristics on individual bank ratings: A cross-country analysis (2006, background): “Gropp and Vesala (2004) examine the European banking systems and suggest that explicit deposit insurance may serve as a commitment device to limit the safety net and permit monitoring by uninsured subordinated debt holders.”
- Competition, Risk-Shifting, and Public Bail-Out Policies (2011, unknown): “A similar procedure appeared to work well in Gropp et al. (2006).”