Comportamento Estratégico em Presidencialismo de Coalizão: As Relações entre Executivo e Legislativo na Elaboração do Orçamento Brasileiro*

By C. Pereira, Bernardo Mueller. 2002

142 citations recorded by the source corpus.

In Brazil the executive has exclusive rights to initiate the annual budget. Legislators have the right to amend the bill; but only if those amendments are compatible with the multi-year budget plan elaborated by the executive as well as with the law on budgetary guidelines. Moreover, congress may not authorize expenditures that exceed the budgetary revenue. It is also the executive, who is entitled to determine which amendment will really be appropriated, as the appropriation is contingent on the availability of resources in the national treasury. This paper argues that those rules not only restrict congressional action, but also enable the president to preserve at low costs its coalition inside Congress. It shows strong evidence that the Brazilian President rewards those legislators who most vote for his interests by executing their individual amendments to the annual budget and, equally, punishes those who vote less by not executing their individual amendments.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/cfef0a6c0ed129b9dd0b6e035d436984a3a5cef3

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In Economics and Econometrics

  1. Fernanda Brollo
  2. T. Nannicini
  3. James Alm

In Political Science and International Relations

  1. Fernanda Brollo
  2. T. Nannicini

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