Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?

By Thomas F. Hellmann, Kevin C. Murdock, Joseph E. Stiglitz. 2000

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The Impact of Green Lending on Credit Risk in China (2018, background): “The significant impact of credit quality [71], ROA [72], and inefficiency, as well as the size of a bank [73] suggests that the NPL ratio of Chinese banks is influenced by variables that also have an effect on the NPL ratio of banks outside of China.”
Institutional development and bank stability: Evidence from transition countries (2014, background): “Also, restrictive regulations might also reduce banks’ charter values and incentivize bankers to take on risky projects (Hellmann et al., 2000; Gonzalez, 2005).”
Bank Leverage and Monetary Policy's Risk-Taking Channel (2013, positive): “and Peydro (2011)) or using ex post measures of bank risk based on loan default rates, either derived from credit registers (Jimenez et al. (2008)) or rating agency estimates (Altunbas, Gambacorta, and Marquez-Ibañez (2010)).”
Bank Leverage and Monetary Policy's Risk-Taking Channel: Evidence from the United States (2016, positive): “…reflect the bank’s risk through the probability of loan repayment, 𝑞.14 The term 𝜉 represents an equity premium in line with existing literature (see, for instance, Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000), Repullo (2004), Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006), and Allen, Carletti, and Marquez (2011)).”