Credence Goods, Efficient Labelling Policies, and Regulatory Enforcement

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On the Economics of Labels: How Their Introduction Affects the Functioning of Markets and the Welfare of All Participants (2015, background): “Since–contrary to Baksi and Bose (2007)–the cheating low-quality firm must also pay the certification cost, imposing and/or increasing τ reduces the marginal return from disguising low-quality units, and discourages fraud.”
The potential role of carbon labeling in a green economy (2012, background): “Baksi and Bose (2007) consider whether self-reporting of credence attributes (with monitoring and punishment of cheaters by the government) is preferable to third-party certification.”
Competing Environmental Labels (2014, background): “Baksi and Bose (2007) find that costless self-labeling by individual firms often dominates a costly third-party label, but only if the government is willing to engage in costly monitoring of the self-labels.”