Capital Regulation after the Crisis: Business as Usual?

By Martin F. Hellwig. 2010

181 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ce44d711d31bf88f5e7dbd4bc055802487656615

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Citations in the corpus

The Manipulation of Basel Risk-Weights (2014, background): “…and relied on short time series; it neglected endogeneities, and lead some commentators to conclude that risk calibrations under the Basel II regime caused excessive indebtedness and maturity transformation, in particular among those banks that are operating under the IRB (Hellwig, 2010).”
Reputational Contagion and Optimal Regulatory Forbearance (2013, unknown): “example, Hellwig (2010) or “Battle to regulate banks has just begun,””
Pro-Cyclical Capital Regulation and Lending (2016, unknown): “4 Our paper also contributes to the literature on the real effects of the credit crunch that followed the recent financial crisis (Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), Puri, Rocholl, and Steffen (2011), Kahle and Stulz (2013), Iyer et al. (2014), Paravisini et al. (2014)). We show that the pro-cyclical ”
From failure to failure: The politics of international banking regulation (2012, background): “…large banks to claim Core Tier 1 capital ratios of 10 per cent when they held equity amounting to just 2 per cent of non-risk-weighted assets (Hellwig, 2010: 3).22 It is no coincidence that in July 2009 – months before the reforms began to take shape – the IIF released a report on the future…”
The Limits of Model-based Regulation (2014, unknown): “…rules that provide less discretion to banks could be more effective in mitigating distortions that lead to excessive leverage in the banking sector (see, for example, Glaeser and Shleifer (2001), Hellwig (2010), Admati and Hellwig (2013), Haldane (2013), and Acharya, Engle, and Pierret (2014)).”
Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Expensive (2013, methodology): “Thus, as argued by Brealey (1996) and Hellwig (2010), the current system of risk-weights used in capital regulation might itself contribute to a credit crunch.”
The Risk Sensitivity of Capital Requirements: Evidence from an International Sample of Large Banks* (2013, methodology): “From its inception, the risk-weighting methodology has been criticized as insufficiently finetuned to distinguish between the riskiness of different portfolio choices of banks in an accurate manner (Avery and Berger, 1991; Jones, 2000; Hellwig, 2010).”