Do Auditors Price Audit Committee's Expertise? The Case of Accounting Vs. Non-Accounting Financial Experts

By Gopal V. Krishnan, Gnanakumar Visvanathan. 2009

135 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ce180a51b12eaed576199ebe11dde9b64e9d75bb

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Chaudhry Ghafran
2. N. O’Sullivan
3. M. Zaman
4. Afzalur Rashid
5. Shangsi Zhou
6. R. Haniffa
7. Ruizhe Wang
8. Timothy Wang

In Strategy and Management

1. Afzalur Rashid
2. Chaudhry Ghafran
3. Shangsi Zhou
4. N. O’Sullivan
5. M. Zaman
6. R. Haniffa
7. Ruizhe Wang
8. Timothy Wang

Citations in the corpus

• Audit Fees and Book-Tax Differences (2012, unknown): “Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) argue that the risk of earnings management is of particular concern for the auditor for two reasons.”
• Revisiting Agency Theory: Evidence of Board Independence and Agency Cost from Bangladesh (2015, background): “2011); (2) the board size as the natural logarithm of the number of directors and as a dichotomous variable that equals one if the board size exceeds the median value (see Vafeas 2000; Krishnan and Visvanathan 2006; De Villiers et al. 2011); (3) director ownership as the above mean percentage of sha”
• The impact of audit committee expertise on audit quality: Evidence from UK audit fees (2017, methodology): “Interestingly, Chan et al. (2013), using a definition of accounting financial expertise similar to Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009), find no significant link with audit fees.”
• Female audit committee members and their influence on audit fees (2018, unknown): “Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009) acknowledge that these are complementary rather than competing theories yet they do not approach them as such.”
• Corporate Governance, Integrated Reporting and the Use of Credibility-enhancing Mechanisms on Integrated Reports (2019, background): “In contrast, the supply-based perspective argues that well-governed companies are characterized by lower misreporting risks and stronger internal control, and thereby auditors are more likely to reduce the extent of audit and audit fees (e.g. Bedard & Johnstone, 2004; Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2009).”
• Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure: Evidence from the US Banking Sector (2013, unknown): “…the ability to set the board’s agenda and influence the information provided to the other board members, CEOs who also act as chairs can hide crucial information more easily from other, in particular non-executive, directors (Haniffa and Cooke 2002; Li et al. 2008; Krishnan and Visvanathan 2009).”
• Corporate Governance Quality, Audit Fees and Non-Audit Services Fees (2011, background): “Hence, future studies may decompose the current definition of financial expertise into more specific types of financial expertise e.g., accounting, finance, tax, and then investigate their association with AF and NASF (see Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2009).”