Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy

By Sam Bucovetsky, Torsten Persson, Guido Tabellini. 2002

550 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/cdd62d16d6d62243ecf3cd036cbb0b95186cc599

Citations in the corpus

• The Politics of Attention (2018, unknown): “didate, should not be confused with the policy 2Variations of classical models abound. See, among others, Duggan (2017) for a comprehensive survey of the theory literature, as well as the textbook of Persson and Tabellini (2000) for applications to important institutions such as public spending and ”
• Long-Run Impacts of Unions on Firms: New Evidence from Financial Markets, 1961–1999 (2009, unknown): “∂P∂πM and ∂P ∂πU are both negative: as the outcome under a firm victory becomesmore “extreme” and more profitable to the firm, fewer workers find that outcome attractive, lowering the chance of an electoral victory 44See Persson and Tabellini (2000) for a guide to models of thissort.”
• Decentralization and Political Institutions (2007, unknown): “Overall, we find that elections have a better effect on accountability in developed compared to developing and transition countries.(39)”
• On the origins of land use regulations: theory and evidence from us metro areas (2013, unknown): “There is a tradition in the Political Economics literature that uses linear discrete choice models to model voters’ decisions to cast their ballot for a candidate or another (Persson and Tabellini, 2000).”
• Removing the Veil of Ignorance in Assessing the Distributional Impacts of Social Policies (2002, unknown): “Our approach to the evaluation of public policy is more ambitious in some respects than the recent literature in welfare economics and is more in line with the objectives of modern political economy (Persson and Tabellini, 2000).”
• Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus (2016, unknown): “Generally, following a distinction first introduced by Persson and Tabellini (2000), these models are labelled adverse selection models because the government has an informational advantage over voters concerning its true competence.”
• One dollar, one vote (2011, unknown): “Moreover, the basic political economy model predicts a relationship between pre-tax-and-transfer income inequality and redistribution (Persson and Tabellini, 2000).”
• Women's Representation and Public Spending (2009, unknown): “In most theoretical models, this is modeled as rents that accrue to the politician or the political party in power (see Persson and Tabellini, 2000 for an overview of political agency models and Svaleryd and Vlachos, 2007 for an example in the context of a probabilistic voting model).”
• Vote-Buying and Reciprocity (2011, unknown): “Other studies have suggested politicians target the well-informed (Grossman and Helpman, 1996), the relatively poor or numerous (Dixit and Londregan, 1996), or those who can solve collective action problems (Persson and Tabellini, 2000).”