Multilateral Intermediation of Foreign Aid: What is the Trade-Off for Donor Countries?

By Matteo Bobba, Andrew J. Powell. 2006

123 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Why would bilateral donors intermediate aid through a multilateral and not extend aid directly? This paper suggests a trade-off: multiple bilateral donors for each recipient may imply coordination and strategic problems but intermediating through a multilateral may dilute individual donor objectives. The paper conducts traditional panel and truly bilateral regressions with bilateral-pair, fixed effects to model aid allocation decisions. The results confirm that politics is important for bilateral donors but also that aid fragmentation and strategic behavior affect aid allocation. Multilaterals solve strategic and coordination problems between donors and, while politics remains significant, there is some evidence for a dilution of this effect.

Subfields: Development, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/cda9b1d477611efe7df28cfc1dc8a8fb522c6445

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Development

  1. B. Adhikari
  2. Eduardo A. Cavallo

In Safety Research

  1. B. Adhikari
  2. Eduardo A. Cavallo

In Sociology and Political Science

  1. B. Adhikari
  2. Eduardo A. Cavallo

Citations in the corpus