The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development: Changing Rules for Realistic Solutions

By Matt Andrews. Governance. An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions, 2013

270 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Preface 1. Change rules, change governments, and develop? 2. Deconstructing the puzzling evidence of reform 3. Overlooking the change context 4. Reforms as overspecified and oversimplified solutions 5. Limited engagement, limited change 6. What you see is not what you get (expecting limits) 7. Problem-driven learning sparks institutional change 8. Finding and fitting solutions that work 9. Broad engagement, broader (and deeper) change 10. Reforming rules of the development game itself.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/cab1d7a21823127751859a8b14d20555c4302fc0

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In Economics and Econometrics

1. P. Lassou
2. Trevor Hopper
3. T. Soobaroyen

In Political Science and International Relations

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In Sociology and Political Science

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2. Trevor Hopper
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Citations in the corpus

• Globalisation, accounting and developing countries (2017, background): “When Andrews (2013) examined 20 IMF and WB Accounting and Auditing Reports of Standards and Codes in Africa since 2003, he found that their Northern-centric prescriptions neglected local needs, cultural differences and context, were too complex, and met the needs of capital markets and business…”