Are Unsolicited Credit Ratings Lower? International Evidence from Bank Ratings

By Winnie P. H. Poon, Michael Firth. 2005

128 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ca3495000738b66946d0b98f32f7b57867a05370

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. C. Bannier
2. Andre Guettler
3. Patrick Behr

In Finance

1. C. Bannier
2. Andre Guettler
3. Patrick Behr

Citations in the corpus

• Rating opaque borrowers: why are unsolicited ratings lower? (2010, background): “Poon and Firth (2005) and Van Roy (2006) observe that Fitch’s so-called shadow 1Generally, the new capital adequacy rules issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision allow the consideration of commissioned as well as of unsolicited ratings.”
• The Economics of Solicited and Unsolicited Credit Ratings (2014, unknown): “Several empirical papers have shown that unsolicited ratings are significantly lower than solicited ratings (e.g., Poon, 2003; Gan, 2004; Poon and Firth, 2005; Van Roy, 2006; Bannier, Behr, and Güttler, 2010).”