Network structure and institutional complexity in an ecology of water management games
By Mark Lubell, Garry Robins, Peng Wang. 2014
222 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Social-ecological systems are governed by a complex of ecology of games featuring multiple actors, policy institutions, and issues, and not just single institutions operating in isolation. We update Long's (1958) ecology of games to analyze the coordinating roles of actors and institutions in the context of the ecology of water management games in San Francisco Bay, California. The ecology of games is operationalized as a bipartite network with actors participating in institutions, and exponential random graph models are used to test hypotheses about the structural features of the network. We found that policy coordination is facilitated mostly by federal and state agencies and collaborative institutions that span geographic boundaries. Network configurations associated with closure show the most significant departures from the predicted model values, consistent with the Berardo and Scholz (2010) "risk hypothesis" that closure is important for solving cooperation problems.
Subfields: Global and Planetary Change, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c9e510b1dc57c4489324ad32fc24d10ce5ad3acb
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Global and Planetary Change
In Safety Research
In Sociology and Political Science
Citations in the corpus
- The Ecology of Games as a Theory of Polycentricity: Recent Advances and Future Challenges (2019, background): “Lubell et al. (2014) and Berardo (2014a) extended the risk hypothesis to the analysis of two-mode networks.”