District magnitude, electoral formula, and the number of parties
By Kenneth Benoit. 2001
149 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Duverger's propositions concerning the psychologicaland mechanical consequences of electoral rules have previously beenexamined mainly through the lens of district magnitude,comparing the properties of single-member district pluralityelections with those of multimember proportional representationelections. The empirical consequences of multi-member plurality(MMP) rules, on the other hand, have received scant attention.Theory suggests that the effect of district magnitude on the numberand concentration of parties will differ with regard to whether theallocation rules are plurality-based or proportional. I test thistheory by drawing on a uniquely large-sample dataset where districtmagnitude and electoral formula vary but the basic universe ofpolitical parties is held constant, applying regression analysis todata from several thousand Hungarian local bodies elected in 1994consisting of municipal councils, county councils, and mayors. Theresults indicate that omitting the variable of electoral formula hasthe potential to cause significant bias in estimates of Duvergerianconsequences of district magnitude. In addition, the analysis ofmulti-member plurality elections from the local election datasetreveals counter-intuitively that candidate and party entry mayincrease with district magnitude under MMP, suggesting importantdirections for future investigation of MMP rules.
Subfields: Communication, Political Science and International Relations, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c8c66d244de7e4fd5324915fc08752e52ca23c71
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Citations in the corpus
- Electoral Laws as Political Consequences: Explaining the Origins and Change of Electoral Institutions (2007, background): “The type of electoral formula also figures in the equation (Benoit 2001), although “if one had to give a single major factor [that] determines the number of parties. . .it would have to be the district magnitude,” according to Taagepera & Shugart (1993, p. 455).”
- Which Electoral Formula Is the Most Proportional? A New Look with New Evidence (2000, background): “The votes come from elections to Hungarian local bodies held in December 1994 (see Benoit 2000).”
- Going It Alone? Strategic Entry under Mixed Electoral Rules (2005, background): “Though Benoit (2001a) finds evidence for electoral coordination by political parties in Hungary’s single-member districts, coordination typically takes place only after the first round: When "two [allied candidates] step forward, one steps back."”