PROCHLO: Strong Privacy for Analytics in the Crowd
By Ú. Erlingsson, Petros Maniatis, Ilya Mironov, David Lie, Mitch Rudominer, Julien Tinnés. 2017
Subfields: Privacy & Security
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Privacy & Security
- Peter Kairouz
- Badih Ghazi
- Vitaly Feldman
- Kunal Talwar
- Abhradeep Thakurta
- Ravi Kumar
- Jonathan Ullman
- Pasin Manurangsi
Citations in the corpus
- Privacy Amplification via Random Check-Ins (2020, methodology): “For this reason, DP has been adopted by companies including Google [20, 10, 18], Apple [2], Microsoft [13], and LinkedIn [31], as well as the US Census Bureau [26].”
- Auditing Differentially Private Machine Learning: How Private is Private SGD? (2020, background): “Differential privacy [DMNS06] has become the de facto standard for guaranteeing privacy in machine learning and statistical analysis, and is now being deployed by many organizations including Apple [TVV + 17], Google [EPK14, BEM + 17, PSM + 18], and the US Census Bureau [HMA + 17].”
- Pure Differentially Private Summation from Anonymous Messages (2020, methodology): “While an analogous setup was first introduced in crytpography by Ishai et al. in their work on cryptography from anonymity [IKOS06], the shuffled model was first proposed for privacy-preserving computations by Bittau et al. [BEM + 17] in their Encode-Shuffle-Analyze architecture.”
- Improved Summation from Shuffling (2019, background): “The work of Ishai et al. is of significant relevance in the context of the recently proposed shuffle model of Differential Privacy (DP) [2] (see also [4, 3]).”
- Scalable and Differentially Private Distributed Aggregation in the Shuffled Model (2019, methodology): “In contrast, protocols based on shuffling work with much weaker assumptions on the server [5, 7].”
- Amplification by Shuffling: From Local to Central Differential Privacy via Anonymity (2018, background): “Our direct motivation is the Encode, Shuffle, Analyze (ESA) architecture and P ROCHLO implementation of Bittau et al. [BEM + 17], which relies on an explicit intermediary that processes LDP reports from users to ensure their anonymity.”
- Differentially-Private "Draw and Discard" Machine Learning (2018, background): “…private applications and the very recent work of [19]; for the second – from the similarities between DDML and the shuffling strategy of [6] and privacy amplification by sampling exploited by [32], [47], [1]; for the third – from recent work in differentially private machine learning…”
- Encode, Shuffle, Analyze Privacy Revisited: Formalizations and Empirical Evaluation (2020, background): “In addition to the above, as in the ESA [2] architecture, an intermediary termed the shuffler can be used to ensure the anonymity of reports without having visibility into report contents (thanks to cryptography).”
- SGX-LKL: Securing the Host OS Interface for Trusted Execution (2019, background): “Bittau et al. [13] introduce an oblivious architecture for monitoring client software behaviour while protecting user privacy.”
- Pan-Private Uniformity Testing (2019, background): “Rigorous privacy guarantees have driven increasing adoption of differential privacy by industry [8, 10, 21, 29], government [1]), and academic researchers [37, 34].”
- Gradient-Leaks: Understanding and Controlling Deanonymization in Federated Learning (2018, background): “Such a deanonymization objective undermines sanitization mechanisms which de-identify model updates, such as decoupling the update from user identity [15], stripping away identifiable metadata [35,83], and blind-shuffling mechanisms [14].”
- Practical and Robust Privacy Amplification with Multi-Party Differential Privacy (2019, methodology): “The shuffling idea was originally proposed in Prochlo [12], where a shuffler is inserted between the users and the server to break the linkage between the report and the user identi-fication.”
- Differentially Private Set Union (2020, background): “Differential privacy is deployed in many industries, including Apple Apple [2017], Google Erlingsson et al. [2014], Bittau et al. [2017], Microsoft Ding et al. [2017], Mozilla Avent et al. [2017], and the US Census Bureau Abowd [2016], Kuo et al. [2018].”
- Locally Differentially Private Frequent Itemset Mining (2018, methodology): “For example, researchers from Google developed RAPPOR [18], [20] and Prochlo [8], which are included as part of Chrome.”
- CoinPress: Practical Private Mean and Covariance Estimation (2020, unknown): “A large body of work now shows that, in principle, nearly every statistical task can be solved privately, and differential privacy is now being deployed by Apple [Dif17], Google [EPK14, BEM + 17], Microsoft [DKY17], and the US Census Bureau [DLS + 17].”
- Privacy and Utility Preserving Sensor-Data Transformations (2019, background): “…mechanisms [9] provide plausible deniability guarantees when estimating, for example, the mean or frequency of a common variable among users [10], with multi-dimensional data released sequentially a more practical privacy model is inferential privacy [11, 12, 13] that measures the difference…”
- Locally Private k-Means in One Round (2021, methodology): “To demonstrate this, we give an algorithm in the shuffle model (Bittau et al., 2017; Erlingsson et al., 2019; Cheu et al., 2019)2 with a similar approximation ratio but with a smaller additive error of Õ(kO↵(1) · p d/✏).”
- An Algorithmic Framework For Differentially Private Data Analysis on Trusted Processors (2018, methodology): “As we mentioned earlier, off-the-shelf DP-algorithms may not be suitable for TEEs for two main reasons.”
- Local Differential Privacy for Evolving Data (2018, methodology): “Our method improves over the naïve solution of simply recomputing the statistic every epoch – which would lead to either privacy parameter or error that scales linearly with the (1)Although the value of that Apple guarantees over the course of say, a week, is not meaningful on its own, Apple does ta”