Coordinating a socially responsible closed-loop supply chain with product recycling
By Shibaji Panda, Nikunja Mohan Modak, Leopoldo Eduardo Cárdenas-Barrón. 2017
338 citations recorded by the source corpus.
This paper analyzes the effects of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and explores channel coordination in a socially responsible manufacturer-retailer closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) by considering two areas – profit maximization and social responsibility through product recycling. The manufacturer is socially responsible and exhibits it by recycling of used product that it collects through the retailer using the reverse channel. It is found that the channel's non-profit maximizing motive through CSR practice generates higher profit margin than the profit maximizing objective and revenue sharing contract resolves channel conflict. Recycling is a key factor for the wholesale price and hence pure profit of the manufacturer because variation of it may lead to decrement or increment even negative wholesale price. Thus, there must be a limit of recycling for optimal benefit. For best channel performance the manufacturer provides the retailer all revenues that it generates through recycling in the form of reward. Thus, CSR is purely a costly endeavor to the manufacturer. Moreover, unlike the pure profit maximizing supply chain CSR has the ability to vary surplus profit share.
Subfields: Management Information Systems, Marketing, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c864cf3f0b8c665c778ad2782512168071e1393e
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In Management Information Systems
In Strategy and Management
Citations in the corpus
- Corporate social responsibility and decision analysis in a supply chain through government subsidy (2019, background): “…channel coordination to specify and quantify the CSR and its impact, Panda and others put forward a revenue-sharing contract to resolve the channel conflict of a supply chain that is dominated by the manufacturer (Panda et al., 2015; Panda and Modak, 2016; Panda et al., 2016; Panda et al., 2017).”
- Research on low-carbon strategies in supply chain with environmental regulations based on differential game (2018, background): “Channel coordination is imperative for improving the performance of the whole supply chain, and CO2 emission reduction requires the cooperation of all partner enterprises (Panda et al., 2017).”