Antecedents and Consequences of Independence Risk: Framework for Analysis
By Karla M. Johnstone, M. Sutton, Terry D. Warfield. 2001
187 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c762cfc348604c6038006866a0958def507fbda3
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In Accounting
- Xiaohua Fang
- Jeffrey L. Callen
- M. Nelson
- Kathryn Kadous
- Mark E. Peecher
- Venkataraman M. Iyer
- E. Bamber
- John J. Maher
Citations in the corpus
- Auditors' Identification with Their Clients and its Effect on Auditors' Objectivity (2007, background): “4 Objectivity is at the heart of the auditor’s value to society: to provide an unbiased opinion on the fairness of the financial statements (Johnstone et al. 2001).”
- Crash Risk and the Auditor-Client Relationship (2017, background): “…auditors gain a better understanding of their client’s business and learn more regarding the critical issues that necessitate specific attention (e.g., Knapp 1991; Johnstone et al. 2001; Johnson et al. 2002; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2002; Beck and Wu 2006; PCAOB 2011b; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2013).”
- Nonaudit Fees, Auditor Independence, and Bond Ratings (2004, background): “If financial statement users perceive the provision of non-audit services to impair auditor independence, then they are likely to impose a cost-of-capital premium for information risk associated with their inability to rely on the audit (Firth 1997; Johnstone et al. 2001).”
- The Effect of Quality Assessment and Directional Goal Commitment on Auditors' Acceptance of Client‐Preferred Accounting Methods (2003, background): “In an auditing context, Johnstone et al. (2001) argue that ambiguity about what alternatives are acceptable is an antecedent to independence impairment.”
- A Model and Literature Review of Professional Skepticism in Auditing (2009, background): “Given the existence of these many powerful but conflicting incentives, it is perhaps not surprising that auditing theoreticians have tended to view auditors as being influenced by the balance of incentives that they face in a particular context (see, e.g., Goldman and Barlev 1974; Nichols and Price ”