The Economics of Bitcoin Mining, or Bitcoin in the Presence of Adversaries

By Joshua A. Kroll, Ian C. Davey, Edward W. Felten. 2013

585 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c55a6c95b869938b817ed3fe3ea482bc65a7206b

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Citations in the corpus

A Survey of Blockchain From the Perspectives of Applications, Challenges, and Opportunities (2019, background): “Peers who use their computational power to mine for blocks are called miners [20].”
SoK: Research Perspectives and Challenges for Bitcoin and Cryptocurrencies (2015, methodology): “[59] further argued that any useful puzzle must produce a pure public good, or else it might increase the amount mining by the amount it recovers, canceling out any recycling effect.”
Tendermint : Consensus without Mining (2014, background): “The ideal protocol is an incentive compatible Nash equilibrium such that deviating from the protocol does not result in a net gain [5].”
The economics of BitCoin price formation (2014, background): “Its rising popularity has attracted a growing interest in BitCoin in general (e.g. Grinberg 2011; Barber et al. 2012; Kroll, Davey, and Felten 2013; Moore and Christin 2013; Bouoiyour, Selmi, and Tiwari (2014); and BitCoin price formation in particular (e.g. Buchholz et al. 2012; Kristoufek 2013;…”
On the Value of Virtual Currencies (2019, background): “3In a more technical paper, Kroll et al. (2013) model a game between Bitcoin miners and Bitcoin holders and characterize a multiplicity of equilibria.”
Bitcoin price and its marginal cost of production: support for a fundamental value (2018, methodology): “The process and technical elaboration of Bitcoin production (‘mining’) is described at length elsewhere (e.g. Kroll, Davey, and Felten 2013; Sapirshtein, Sompolinsky, and Zohar 2016; Nakamoto 2008).”
From mining to markets: The evolution of bitcoin transaction fees (2019, background): “Kroll et al [2013] does include transaction fees but argues they have little importance.”
Cryptocurrencies Without Proof of Work (2014, background): “[17]) in which players have to choose one of only these two actions (**),”
Quantification of energy and carbon costs for mining cryptocurrencies (2018, methodology): “To identify the total CO2 emissions attributable to each cryptocurrency network from mining, we determined the daily number of coins created from the daily average block completion time and block reward as shown in equation (7).”
Majority is not enough (2013, unknown): “More formally, Kroll, Davey and Felten’s work [19] provides a game-theoretic analysis of Bitcoin, without taking into account block withholding attacks such as selfish mining, and argues that the honest strategy constitutes a Nash equilibrium, implying incentive-compatibility.”
A Survey on Consensus Mechanisms and Mining Strategy Management in Blockchain Networks (2018, background): “Since the introduction of ASIC devices and pool mining for PoW-based blockchain networks, concerns have been raised about the nodes’ incentive to fully abide by the protocol [53], [54], [58], [114].”
Price Fluctuations and the Use of Bitcoin: An Empirical Inquiry (2015, unknown): “It will asymptotically approach the maximum, with 99 percent of the final supply estimated to be issued by 2032, and 100 percent by 2140 [89].”