A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation

By Debraj Ray. 2007

409 citations recorded by the source corpus.

The formation of coalitions to achieve both collaborative and competitive goals is a phenomenon we see all around us. The list is long and varied: production cartels, political lobbies, customs unions, environmental coalitions, and ethnic alliances are just a few everyday instances. Drawing upon and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures at the University of Essex, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. How are agreements determined? Which coalitions will form? And are such agreements invariably efficient from a social perspective? Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements. This book concentrates on pure theory, but discusses several potential applications, such as oligopoly and the provision of public goods.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c54b47acad448eba10cd490012b05fb431cbe94f

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Joan Esteban
2. Debraj Ray
3. Walid Saad
4. Zhu Han
5. Dusist Niyato
6. Bhaskar Dutta
7. Rajiv Vohra
8. Michael M. Ting

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Joan Esteban
2. Walid Saad
3. Zhu Han
4. Dusist Niyato
5. Debraj Ray
6. Rajiv Vohra
7. Bhaskar Dutta
8. Michael M. Ting

Citations in the corpus

• Coalitional game theory for communication networks (2009, neutral): “The approaches used for distributed coalition formation ar e quite varied and range from heuristic approaches [25], Markov chain-based methods [26], to set theory based method s [27] as well as approaches that use bargaining theory or other negotiation techniques from economics [28].”
• On the Salience of Ethnic Conflict (2008, methodology): “We draw on standard theories of coalition formation (see Ray 2007 and the references therein).”
• Rational Expectations and Farsighted Stability (2017, background): “This is a direction of research that has attracted renewed interest; see, for example, Harsanyi (1974), Aumann and Myerson (1988), Chwe (1994), Bloch (1996), Ray and Vohra (1997, 1999), Xue (1998), Diamantoudi and Xue (2003), Konishi and Ray (2003), Herings et al.”
• Game Theory in Wireless and Communication Networks (2008, methodology): “The approaches used for distributed coalition formation are quite varied and range from heuristic approaches [465] and Markov-chain-based methods [398] to set-theory-based methods [41], as well as approaches that use bargaining theory or other negotiation techniques from economics [44].”
• Uneven Growth: A Framework for Research in Development Economics (2010, background): “As I have discussed in more detail in Ray (2007), it is possible to enrich this discussion by bringing in the role of how early institutions set patterns for longterm growth (as in Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997; Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001).”
• Coalitions in theory and reality: a review of pertinent variables and processes (2015, background): “Ray, D. (2007). A game-theoretic perspective on coalition formation.”