What Drives Taxi Drivers? A Field Experiment on Fraud in a Market for Credence Goods
By Loukas Balafoutas, A. Beck, Rudolf Kerschbamer, Matthias Sutter. Social Science Research Network, 2013
229 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Credence goods are characterized by informational asymmetries between sellers and consumers that invite fraudulent behavior by sellers. This paper presents the results of a natural field experiment on taxi rides in Athens, Greece, set up to measure different types of fraud and to examine the influence of passengers’ presumed information and income on the extent of fraud. Results reveal that taxi drivers cheat passengers in systematic ways: Passengers with inferior information about optimal routes are taken on longer detours while asymmetric information on the local tariff system leads to manipulated bills. Higher income seems to lead to more fraud.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c4c0b5bf6847b843df6af054b426ae7700201b87
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In Economics and Econometrics
In Management Science and Operations Research
In Safety Research
- Mauricio Romero
- K. Muralidharan
- K. Wuthrich
- David Y. Yang
- Henry S. Schneider
- Leonardo Bursztyn
- A. Ganimian
- Richard J. Murnane
Citations in the corpus
- Misperceptions About Others (2021, background): “2: Overview of papers on perceptions about others not included in the meta-analyses Label Paper Context N Primary beliefs Treatment B-20 Bergman (2020) low-income area students in Los Angeles 306 child’s effort in school yes BBK-13 Balafoutas et al. (2013) taxi drivers in Athens, Greece 124 taxi dri”
- Factorial Designs, Model Selection, and (Incorrect) Inference in Randomized Experiments (2019, background): “A Field Experiment on Fraud in a Market for Credence Goods ReStud 2013 126 5 6 0 Yes No Kendall et al. (2015) How Do Voters Respond to Information?”
- Agency Problems and Reputation in Expert Services: Evidence from Auto Repair (2012, background): “9 Bar-Isaac and Tadelis [2008] describe the reputation literature in more detail. 10 See Grosskopf and Sarin [2010], p. 2189, for references on experimental studies of related games, and Palfrey and Prisbey [1996], Andreoni and Croson [2008] and others on identifying reputation from altruism and oth”