Detecting BGP configuration faults with static analysis

By N. Feamster, Hari Balakrishnan. 2005

396 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c43f7fc3e889ae125ad538d344a68638a4b50ed1

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Citations in the corpus

BGP routing policies in ISP networks (2005, background): “Conguration checking tools can avoid miscongurations by verifying certain consistency criteria hold [ 11 ], and modeling tools can predict side-effects of conguration changes on routers within an ISP [5].”
SPHINX: Detecting Security Attacks in Software-Defined Networks (2015, background): “…known and potentially unknown attacks on network topology and data plane forwarding originating within an SDN. SPHINX leverages the novel abstraction of flow graphs, which closely approximate the actual network operations, to enable incremental validation of all network updates and constraints.”
VeriFlow: verifying network-wide invariants in real time (2012, unknown): “Analysis of conﬁguration ﬁles [13, 28] is useful, but cannot ﬁnd bugs in router software, and must be designed for speciﬁc conﬁguration languages and control protocols.”
A clean slate 4D approach to network control and management (2005, methodology): “Several tools provide analysis across configuration files to reverse engineer the router topology and summarize the status of the network [8, 9, 10, 40, 41, 8].”
Abstractions for network update (2012, background): “In the past, a number of tools have been developed to analyze static network configurations [24].”
In VINI veritas: realistic and controlled network experimentation (2006, methodology): “PL-VINI’s current machinery for mirroring the A bilene topology automatically generates the necessary XORP and Cl ick configurations (and determines the appropriate co-located nodes at PlanetLab PoPs) for a VINI experiment from the actual Abilen e routing configuration, exploiting the configuration-”
Interactive Analytical Processing in Big Data Systems: A Cross-Industry Study of MapReduce Workloads (2012, background): “We expect small variation between different use cases, and the representative features are already captured in publications on the web indexing use case and existing microbenchmarks.”
Design and implementation of a routing control platform (2005, background): “Using the high-level correctness properties from previous work as a guide [21], we recognize that routing within the network must satisfy the following properties (note that iBGP does not intrinsically satisfy them [6, 21]): Route validity: The RCS should not assign routes that create forwarding loo”
Header Space Analysis: Static Checking for Networks (2012, methodology): “[11, 9, 10, 15], and work on routing failures [12, 13] are all tailored to IP networks.”
FIREMAN: a toolkit for firewall modeling and analysis (2006, background): “There are numerous studies on network topology, IP connectivity [5, 18, 28], and router configurations [10, 13, 14, 25].”
A security enforcement kernel for OpenFlow networks (2012, methodology): “The router configuration checker (rcc) uses constraint solving and static analysis to find faults in BGP configurations [8].”
Participatory networking: an API for application control of SDNs (2013, methodology): “Networking and Declarative Languages PANE’s design is inspired by projects such as the Margrave tool for ﬁrewall analysis [37] and the Router Conﬁguration Checker [15], which apply declarative languages to network conﬁguration.”
A General Approach to Network Configuration Verification (2017, methodology): “Tools such as rcc [12], IP Assure [25], and Minerals [2], focus on nding common mistakes and inconsistencies in con gurations of di erent protocols.”
Debugging the data plane with anteater (2011, methodology): “As in any complex computer system, enterprise networks are prone to a wide range of errors [10, 11, 12, 14, 25, 32, 38, 41], such as miscon-ﬁguration, software bugs, or unexpected interactions across protocols.”
A General Approach to Network Configuration Analysis (2015, background): “Prior work on verification in several domains has shown that inconsistent behavior often points to bugs [6, 7].”
FlowChecker: configuration analysis and verification of federated openflow infrastructures (2010, background): “Also, there was a considerable amount of work on detecting misconfiguration in routing ( [10], [12], [5], and [16]).”
A study of prefix hijacking and interception in the internet (2007, background): “Overall, a majority of the ASes struggle to maintain up-to-date filters or any filters at all [27,47,49].”