Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public Order

By J. Mcmillan, Christopher Woodruff. 2000

217 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c3798184ded2b410097d8036e321fef1baef9798

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Citations in the corpus

The Best Laid Plans: The Impact of Informal Rules on Formal Institutions in Transitional Regimes (2010, background): “…influence can attenuate as modern political and economic institutions replace localized informal arrangements.22 Social networks and reputations can “serve as substitutes for functioning legal systems, while business networks function better when courts are effective (McMillan and Woodruff 2000).””
On Modes of Economic Governance (2001, background): “Ostrom (1990) reports several case studies of the governance of common resource pools; Ellickson (1991) studies the protection of property rights among cattle ranchers in northern California; McMillan and Woodruff (2000) discuss private governance of contracts in emerging market economies, particula”
Social Capital, Investments and External Financing (2015, unknown): “Finally, evidence suggests that since social capital provides information sharing and punishment through reputation loss (Kandori, 1992; McMillan and Woodruff, 2000), the expected cost to mangers for expropriation increases.”
The Central Role of Entrepreneurs in Transition Economies (2002, unknown): “In Poland and in Russia, de novo manufacturing rms grew faster, invested at a higher rate and generated faster employment growth than did privatized rms (Belka et al., 1995; Richter and Schaffer, 1996; Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff, 2000).”
Institutions and Economic Growth in Historical Perspective (2014, background): “…growth does not require public legal mechanisms but can be based on private-order institutions (Clay, 1997; Faille, 2007; Greif, 1989, 2006b,c; McMillan and Woodruff, 2000; O’Driscoll and Hoskins, 2006), or that the social capital of closely knit networks can effectively support market-based…”
Commitment, Coercion and Markets: The Nature and Dynamics of Institutions Supporting Exchange (2005, unknown): “Relational contracting (in which one’s conduct in a particular situation reflects considerations regarding its implications on the entirety of the relationship over time and situations; e.g, McMillan and Woodruff 2000).”
Are middlemen facilitators or barriers to improve smallholders' welfare in rural economies? Empirical evidence from Ethiopia (2016, background): “It may decrease efficiency, for instance, by excluding new entrants from participating in themarket, by applying price collusion and by constraining entrepreneurship (McMillan and Woodruff, 1999; Fafchamps, 2000).”