Banking on Stability: The Political Economy of New Capital Requirements in the European Union
By D. Howarth, L. Quaglia. 2013
125 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Abstract The Basel III Accord on a ‘Global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems’ was issued in late 2010 as the cornerstone of the international regulatory response to the global financial crisis. Its adoption into European Union (EU) legislation has, however, been met with considerable member state reticence and intra-EU negotiations are ongoing. This paper investigates the political economy of new capital requirements in the EU, arguing that the institutional features of national banking sectors convincingly account for the divergence in EU member state preferences on capital rules.
Subfields: Finance, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c36a3d97dff492f6ccfce8f2d00cbe0c5e11e26c
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Citations in the corpus
- European integration and the crisis: practice and theory (2015, background): “11 EU politics have created discrepancies between Basel III and the CRD IV package, according to Howarth and Quaglia (2013).”
- Banking Union as Holy Grail: Rebuilding the Single Market in Financial Services, Stabilizing Europe's Banks and ‘Completing’ Economic and Monetary Union (2013, background): “Partly for this reason, the proposed Capital Requirement IV legislation comprises a directive (European Commission, 2011a); and a regulation, which imposes a maximum harmonization directly applicable in the Member States, thereby leaving little room for manoeuvre in national transposition (European ”