Toward Automated Dynamic Malware Analysis Using CWSandbox
By Carsten Willems, Thorsten Holz, Felix C. Freiling. 2007
828 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Computer Networks and Communications, Information Systems, Signal Processing
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Computer Networks and Communications
- Giorgio Giacinto
- Davide Maiorca
- Wenke Lee
- Battista Biggio
- Igino Corona
- Engin Kirda
- Christopher Krügel
- Lorenzo Cavallaro
In Information Systems
- Giorgio Giacinto
- Davide Maiorca
- Igino Corona
- Taesoo Kim
- Meng Xu
- Battista Biggio
- Lorenzo Cavallaro
- Christopher Krügel
In Signal Processing
- Giorgio Giacinto
- Davide Maiorca
- Battista Biggio
- Lorenzo Cavallaro
- Wenke Lee
- Igino Corona
- Taesoo Kim
- Meng Xu
Citations in the corpus
- Looking at the bag is not enough to find the bomb: an evasion of structural methods for malicious PDF files detection (2013, methodology): “MalOffice uses pdftk3 to extract JavaScript code, and CWSandbox [41] to analyze the code behavior: code classi.cation is carried out by a set of rules.”
- Malware Analysis and Classification: A Survey (2014, methodology): “Several online automated tools exist for dynamic analysis of malwares, e.g. Norman Sandbox [19], CWSandbox [20], Anubis [21] and TTAnalyzer [22], Ether [23] and ThreatExpert [24].”
- PlatPal: Detecting Malicious Documents with Platform Diversity (2017, methodology): “This is in contrast with traditional sandboxed malware analysis such as Cuckoo [44] or CWSandbox [63], which executes the malware and examines its behavior and influence on the host operating system during runtime.”
- AppsPlayground: automatic security analysis of smartphone applications (2013, background): “CWSandbox [29] and Botlab [12] study malware behavior in monitored environments.”
- Ether: malware analysis via hardware virtualization extensions (2008, methodology): “Approaches that employ these ideas to obtain scalability include malware analysis services such as Norman Sandbox [13], CWSandbox [47] and Anubis [1].”
- Mobile-sandbox: having a deeper look into android applications (2013, background): “This is a common problem in Windows-based dynamic analysis [25].”
- A Pattern Recognition System for Malicious PDF Files Detection (2012, background): “CWSandbox [14] is a sophisticated platform capable to extract the dynamic behavior of a computer system once a certain (e.”
- An Android Application Sandbox system for suspicious software detection (2010, methodology): “CWSandbox [34] or Java sandboxes [12], but especially smartphone platforms lack such kind of analysing software2.”
- A Survey on Malware Detection Using Data Mining Techniques (2017, methodology): “For example, Detours [Hunt and Brubacher 1998] is a dynamic instrumentation tool that can detect Windows APIs invoked by a malware sample, and CWSandbox [Willems et al. 2007] monitors Windows API calls by the malware by performing API hooking and DLL injection.”
- CopperDroid: Automatic Reconstruction of Android Malware Behaviors (2015, background): “Tracking system call invocations is at the basis of virtually all dynamic malware behavioral analysis systems [24], [27], [41].”
- Effective and Efficient Malware Detection at the End Host (2009, background): “Some tools [6, 54] provide reports that summarize the activities of unknown programs at the level of Windows API or system calls.”
- Novel Feature Extraction, Selection and Fusion for Effective Malware Family Classification (2015, methodology): “are variants is concerned, the need for the automation of this process is clear-cut. The analysis of malicious programs is usually carried out by static techniques [39, 48, 34] and dynamic techniques [45, 37, 9, 46]. Analyzers extract various characteristics from the programs’ syntax and semantic su”
- Dynamic Malware Analysis in the Modern Era—A State of the Art Survey (2019, methodology): “CWSandbox [58] is based on code injection of a trusted DLL into the analyzed process, which intercepts function calls by overwriting entries in the Export Address Table (EAT) and redirecting execution to CWSandbox .”