Ambiguity without a state space
By David S. Ahn. 2004
156 citations recorded by the source corpus.
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c27b86fec880ccfcb3d154a50a832e547834b52d
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- Shachar Kariv
- Syngjoo Choi
- M. Machina
- Yoram Halevy
- T. Sarver
- Marciano M. Siniscalchi
- Douglas Gale
- Faruk Gul
Citations in the corpus
- Estimating Ambiguity Aversion in a Portfolio Choice Experiment (2009, background): “1See, MEU: Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989); CEU: Schmeidler (1989); α-MEU: Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004) and Olszewski (2007); contraction expected utility: Gajdos, Hayashi, Tallon, and Vergnaud (2008); REU: Ergin and Gul (2004), Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005), Nau (2006), Seo ”
- Choice with imprecise information: an experimental approach (2010, background): “2 See recent papers by Ahn et al. (2007); Stecher and Dickhaut (2008) for different approaches.”
- Statistical decisions under ambiguity (2011, background): “Ahn (2003) and Olszewski (2007) take the sets of lotteries induced by acts as primitives, thus avoiding state spaces altogether; although C does not explicitly appear in their approach, a non-behavioral interpretation is implied.8 Having said that, a behavioral interpretation is certainly of…”
- Ellsberg Revisited: An Experimental Study (2007, methodology): “Schmeidler (1989) derived the Choquet expected utility (CEU) model axiomatically. When these preferences exhibit global ambiguity aversion (convex capacity) they can be represented by the MEU model. Segal (1987) showed in an early thought-provoking paper that when ambiguity is modeled as a two-stage”
- ANTICIPATING REGRET : WHY FEWER OPTIONS MAY BE BETTER (2008, methodology): “This observation touches upon an issue that we will discuss in more detail in Section 4.1: While existing models of regret (see Bell (1982), Loomes and Sugden (1982, 1987), Sugden (1993), Hayashi (2007)) only identify regret through its distorting effect on an agent’s choice of alternative from a me”
- EXPECTED UNCERTAIN UTILITY THEORY (2014, background): “Dempster (1967) and Shafer (1976) were concerned with the relationship between basic belief assignments and belief (and possibility) functions13 and how to update belief functions in light of new information; by contrast, our results relate belief functions to preferences over acts.”
- Ambiguity and Ambiguity Aversion (2014, background): “In experiments which included professional actuaries, and where subjects were asked to price insurance both as consumers and firms, Hogarth and Kunreuther (1989) found results which paralleled those of Kahn and Sarin (1988), Viscusi and Chesson (1999) and others as reported above, namely that both c”
- A simplified axiomatic approach to ambiguity aversion (2010, result): “(2004), and Ahn (2008). 8Hazen (1987) constructs and axiomatizes a model that is similar in spirit to SEOU, but differs from it in the way that some nonexpected utility models differ from expected utility.”