Criminal Investigation Enforcement Activities and Taxpayer Noncompliance
By J. Dubin. 2007
123 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c10915e57934c514228d08db0fd35ae5c06e19b6
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- James Alm
- Mohd Rizal Palil
- Benno Torgler
- M. McKee
- B. Jackson
- Friedrich Schneider
- Raihana Mohdali
- J. Pope
In Economics and Econometrics
- James Alm
- Mohd Rizal Palil
- Benno Torgler
- M. McKee
- B. Jackson
- Friedrich Schneider
- G. Mascagni
- E. Kirchler
In Sociology and Political Science
Citations in the corpus
- Getting the word out: Enforcement information dissemination and compliance behavior (2009, background): “This ripple effect is comparable to estimates provided by Dubin et al. (1990) and Dubin (2007), all of which were generated from field data.”
- Tax knowledge and tax compliance determinants in self assessment system in Malaysia (2010, methodology): “In contrast, Clotfelter (1983), Dubin and Wilde (1986) and Beron et.”
- WHAT MOTIVATES TAX COMPLIANCE? (2018, unknown): “…and Woodbury (1985), Dubin and Wilde (1988), Alm, Bahl, and Murray (1990, 1993), Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (1990), Feinstein (1991), Erard (1992), Dubin (2007), Alm and Yunus (2009), Johannessen (2014), Advani, Elming, and Shaw (2015), DeBacker et al. (2015), Alm, Clark, and Leibel (2016),…”
- Do Ethics Matter? Tax Compliance and Morality (2011, background): “For example, Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (1990) find that, for every dollar of revenue produced because of taxpayer audits, an additional six dollars of revenue were generated from these indirect or “ripple” effects on individuals not actually audited. More recent work by Dubin (2007) estimates an even”
- Measuring, explaining, and controlling tax evasion: lessons from theory, experiments, and field studies (2012, background): “Audits also seem to have a “spillover effect”, or an increase in compliance independent of revenues generated directly from the audits and penalties themselves (Dubin, 2007).”