The Spread of Antidumping Regimes and the Role of Retaliation in Filings

By Robert M. Feinberg, Kara M. Reynolds. 2004

128 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Over the past decade, the world-wide use of antidumping has become very widespread – 41 WTO-member countries initiated antidumping cases over the 1995-2003 period. From another perspective, US exporters were subjected to 139 antidumping cases during this period, by enforcement agencies representing 20 countries. In this context, it is natural to consider whether antidumping filings may be motivated as retaliation against similar measures imposed on a country’s exporters. This is the focus of our study, though we also control for the bilateral export flows involved and non-retaliatory impacts of past cases, with other motivations – macroeconomic, industry-specific and political considerations – dealt with through industry, country and year fixed effects. Applying probit analysis to a WTO database on reported filings, we find strong evidence that retaliation was a significant motive in explaining the rise of antidumping filings over the past decade, though interesting differences emerge in the reactions to traditional and new users of antidumping.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Media Technology

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c08cd0e72b35f091f6d4e2f593546db3d78f6b19

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. C. Bown
2. E. Reinhardt
3. Jeffrey Kucik
4. Patricia Tovar
5. Beth A. Simmons
6. M. Busch
7. Meredith A. Crowley

In Media Technology

1. E. Reinhardt
2. Jeffrey Kucik
3. C. Bown

Citations in the corpus

• Is the WTO Passé (2015, unknown): “Motivated by empirical work by Blonigen and Bown (2003), Feinberg and Reynolds (2006) and Prusa and Skeath (2002) that provides evidence of a retaliatory role for anti-dumping duties, Martin and Vergote argue that such on-equilibrium-path retaliation may facilitate e¢ ciency gains by ensuring that…”
• Trade Liberalization, Antidumping, and Safeguards: Evidence from India's Tariff Reform (2011, background): “Recent papers finding evidence consistent with retaliatory effects on different samples of antidumping use data include Blonigen and Bown (2003), Prusa and Skeath (2002), Feinberg and Reynolds (2006) and Vandenbussche and Zanardi (2008).”
• Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the Global Trade Regime (2008, background): “…Rosendorff 2002+ 43+ Feinberg and Reynolds 2006+ For similar findings, also see Prusa and Skeath 2002; and Blonigen and Bown 2003+ 44+ See Bown and Crowley 2006; and Feinberg and Reynolds 2006+ 45+ We could alternatively base this indicator on major trading partners rather than regional…”