How To Simulate It - A Tutorial on the Simulation Proof Technique
By Yehuda Lindell. 2016
578 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computational Theory and Mathematics
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Artificial Intelligence
- Adrià Gascón
- Mariana Raykova
- Tancrède Lepoint
- Phillipp Schoppmann
- Borja Balle
- Zhicong Huang
- James Bell
- Kim Laine
In Computational Theory and Mathematics
- Mariana Raykova
- Tancrède Lepoint
- Kim Laine
- Hao Chen
- Adrià Gascón
- Zhicong Huang
- Divya Gupta
- Nishanth Chandran
Citations in the corpus
- Secure Single-Server Aggregation with (Poly)Logarithmic Overhead (2020, methodology): “note that the proof of security uses a standard simulation-based approach [20, 28] similar to the one by Bonawitz et al.”
- Privacy-Preserving Distributed Linear Regression on High-Dimensional Data (2017, methodology): “To prove security, we use a simulation-based approach [30, 47] where one argues that a protocol is secure if it can be simulated in an ideal environment in which there is no data leakage by definition.”
- Cheetah: Lean and Fast Secure Two-Party Deep Neural Network Inference (2022, methodology): “We provide security against a static semi-honest probabilistic polynomial time adversary A following the simulation paradigm [11, 22, 38].”
- Fast Private Set Intersection from Homomorphic Encryption (2017, background): “For a formal definition of simulation based security in the semi-honest setting, we refer the reader to [40].”
- Survey on Federated Learning Threats: concepts, taxonomy on attacks and defences, experimental study and challenges (2022, methodology): “Note that We refer to SFL protocols as FL protocols that attains the security in the simulation-based framework used to formalize the notion of security [132, 133, 134].”
- CrypTFlow2: Practical 2-Party Secure Inference (2020, methodology): “Semi-honest security of the protocol will follow trivially from sequential composibility of individual sub-protocols [18, 32, 47].”