Bailouts in a Federation

By Timothy J. Goodspeed. 2002

274 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bf64acf869c950c963aa1f1bf4aa5b2167720397

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In Accounting

1. Lusine Lusinyan
2. L. Eyraud
3. I. Sanz
4. T. Baskaran
5. N. Gemmell
6. R. Kneller

In Economics and Econometrics

1. I. Sanz
2. R. Kneller
3. N. Gemmell
4. L. Eyraud
5. Lusine Lusinyan
6. T. Baskaran
7. Niklas Potrafke
8. Joel Stiebale

In Political Science and International Relations

1. L. Eyraud
2. Lusine Lusinyan
3. I. Sanz
4. T. Baskaran
5. N. Gemmell
6. R. Kneller
7. Niklas Potrafke

Citations in the corpus

• Sovereign Bond Market Reactions to Fiscal Rules and No-Bailout Clauses - The Swiss Experience (2013, unknown): “3This commitment problem in federal systems has been studied extensively in the literature; see, e.g., the models by Wildasin (1997) and Goodspeed (2002) as well as the survey in Oates (2005). a favourable assessment at financial markets, since their liabilities are backed up by the guarantor,…”
• Ex-Post Redistribution in a Federation: Implications for Corrective Policy (2006, unknown): “…for ex-post transfers, state governments choose a suboptimal level of public expenditures and taxes (e.g. Wildasin, 1997, Bordignon et al., 2001, Goodspeed, 2002, Boadway et al., 2003, Akai and Sato, 2005, and Boadway and Tremblay, 2005).9 The literature provides a comprehensive treatment of…”
• Are Fiscal Adjustments Less Successful in Decentralized Governments? (2009, unknown): “If the federal government consolidates, the states have an incentive to spend additionally and incur additional debt in order to be bailed-out by the federal government in the future (Goodspeed 2002, Feld and Goodspeed 2005).”
• Vertical fiscal imbalances and fiscal performance in advanced economies (2013, background): “They may have more political leverage, because their interests are over-represented in the central legislature, and because a central government seeking to maximize its chances of reelection will be more prone to bailout subnational authorities representing a larger share of the population (Goodspee”
• The Impact of Fiscal Decentralization: A Survey (2015, unknown): “Second, elected officials face substantial incentives to exploit the fiscal common by over-borrowing in order to increase local public goods provision (Goodspeed, 2002).”
• On the optimal design of disaster insurance in a federation (2011, unknown): “In this literature, for instance, Goodspeed (2002) shows in a world of certainty how the central government pursuit of vote maximization can lead it to capitulate to profligate regional governments, bailing them out after bouts of 1 Cornes and Silva (2000) model an information asymmetry as well—the…”
• FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: SPENDING VERSUS REVENUE DECENTRALIZATION (2013, background): “…contends that local government may expect to be bailed out from their fiscal deficits by central governments, given the likelihood that failure to rescue local governments would lower local welfare with some of the political costs placed shifted to central government by voters (Goodspeed 2002).”
• On the link between fiscal decentralization and public debt in OECD countries (2010, background): “In a study with panel data on 32 industrial and developing countries, Jin and Zou (2002) reach more differentiated conclusions by disaggregating the general concept of fiscal decentralization into different “representations”.”