Notes on Equilibria in Symmetric Games

By Shih-Fen Cheng, Daniel M. Reeves, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Michael P. Wellman. 2004

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Discrete convex analysis: A tool for economics and game theory (2016, background): “Although assuming concavity on the entire strategy space is somewhat stringent, this result generalizes the result of Cheng et al. (2004) that every n-person symmetric “two-strategy” game has a (not necessarily symmetric) Nash equilibrium, because any realvalued function on the n-product of a double”
The Politics of Attention (2018, background): “. Second, in the extension to noisy news{which, in our opinion, more accurately paints the reality but is probably too dicult to be studied upfront{the existence of symmetric equilibria follows from Cheng et al. (2004) in the case where (1) the policy space is compact and convex, and (2) the news di”